The idea of rolling the United States Air Force into other services is not a new. Let us look at some of the issues and opportunities that this has to offer.
Creating the United States Air Force (USAF) in 1947 was the right idea at the right time. Military aviation technology concepts were moving fast. It offered a focus on learning new technologies in aviation and space.
Today, after the end of the Cold War, USAF no longer has a large number of creative aerospace engineers working for it and is hardly pushing any world beating technology of its own initiative.
The USAF refuses to replace old aircraft at any useful pace. The new aircraft being purchased are expensive to own and operate, with no credible combat capability; including: no war attrition tolerance.
USAF tanker and airlift fleets are a mess. There is no replacement for the C-5 or C-17. Light airlift was killed.
The KC-46, a sick joke. For over 20 years, USAF is not capable of fielding a new aerial refueling tanker.
USAF flag leadership warm chairs with no value to the defense of the nation. All of the problems mentioned are a short list.
How would this merge to the other services (mostly the Army) happen?
1. Airlift-Tanker.
A replacement of the C-5 needs to happen as a priority. The C-5M upgrade did not solve all C-5 ageing aircraft issues.
Until then, used 747-400s of which there are many, could be converted into cargo/passenger/tankers. This would help fill in theater-airlift gaps.
C-17s are an important capability. Unfortunately, early production jets are getting old. The C-17 is no longer in production. It has now joined the ageing aircraft club.
This replacement effort should be a priority.
The A-400M should be purchased as an additional airlift resource. When you look at the specifications of this aircraft it is neither fish, nor fowl. Yet, if the C-17 replacement stalls, medium tactical airlift will need help. This doesn’t solve the C-17 age issue but reduces the pain.
C-130Js should never be allowed to end production.
C-27s should used to supplement our airlift capability.
All of the airlift assets mentioned can be put into the Army Reserve and National Guard.
The American military aerial refueling capability is such a mess that drastic action will have to be taken. It should no longer be considered a one-service dominant capability.
The KC-46 program has failed. As the winning vendor, it should be removed and replaced with the runner up: the Northrop/Airbus KC-30. The KC-30 is in service with other nations and works well.
Here the Navy can help. KC-30s should be assigned as one squadron per numbered fleet. Navy reserve where practical.
U.S. Army squadrons would also be created as needed. Army Reserve and National Guard where practical.
Where practical, contractors can do tanker operations for the U.S. military for the United States, U.S. territories and the Canada region. Also: aircraft deliveries overseas. No direct war support with contractors. This will happen with former USAF KC-135s until the market adapts other platforms.
KC-135s should be retired as fast as possible. Given the state of the tanker mess, this may take many years.
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (IRS). This capability in all platforms--air breathing fixed wing and space--can be operated successfully by the U.S. Army.
2. Nuclear deterrent.
Inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) can be managed by the U.S. Army.
The mission of manned long-range, nuclear strike ends.
3. Long-range bombers.
The B-2 and B-1 will be retired. Both of these reside on the silly premise that these aircraft can penetrate a modern air defense system. Along with that: no future B-21 budget raider.
The B-52 will remain. It is a successful idea and doesn’t depend on penetrating a modern air defense system to be useful. Of the three long-range bombers, it has the best mission capability rates. A replacement with similar (not gold-plated) capability should be a priority.
4. Tactical aircraft.
Since there will be no USAF, there is no requirement to take responsibility of stupid decisions made by the service.
The F-35 USAF requirement will end. It eats too much national treasure for very little return in combat capability.
F-16 aircraft should be put into the 20 or so national air sovereignty locations throughout the U.S. as a separate command or numbered Army Air Force or whatever the leadership decides to call it. Much like the old USAF Air Defense Command (ADC). This is important for the purpose of focusing on the work at hand that is also shared with our Canadian allies. That is, to intercept unknown aircraft close to our national border. This should be a blended unit with active duty Army and Army Reserve as an important national defense effort; which does not require National Guard involvement. Many F-16s will be retired from this reorganization, however, the current low rate of F-16 production should continue to replace old F-16s.
The Zamboni mission. This is slang sometimes heard in the USAF to describe the deployed air domination mission of F-15C/D aircraft. They prepare the ice so the real mission of war winning by other tactical aircraft can happen. After most war efforts, they don’t do very much. Since the F-22 can do deep strike/interdiction, it doesn’t always fall into this category.
All F-15C/Ds go away. All F-15Es and new F-15s assist the F-22 in clearing air threats the first nights of a war.
A priority replacement project has to happen to solve the F-22 aircraft ageing issues. This process is married to new F-15 aircraft capability.
Interdiction and close air support. The F-15E and new F-15 builds will be the primary interdiction aircraft. Other aircraft like the B-52 and Navy aircraft will assist as needed.
A side note on the threat. As Bill Sweetman pointed out years ago, no flag-level leadership was able to explain to him in what situation we would deploy land forces were we did not have complete control of the air and/or anti-access threat.
That should stand as policy. If we don’t have control of the anti-access threat, ground troops will die. We should never put our land forces into such a situation.
Insisting that the interdiction and close air support mission should be performed by some kind of gold-plated unreliable, expensive to own and operate stealth aircraft should be considered lunacy.
Close air support: A-10, Tucano, Apache, AC-130. Interdiction aircraft and multi-service aircraft where practical.
The Future.
All that I have suggested falls into the category of: now I have done my duty as an over-stressed taxpayer.
It should not be dismissed as impossible. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States Air Force has been given several come-to-Jesus opportunities to solve its many problems. Each time they have failed.
Now is the time to thank that institutional idea for its service, and, end it.
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