Tongo Tongo blame game

U.S. Green Berets, training Niger armed forces. March 2017 (DOD photo)

This is a  story of the infamous Niger Ambush in 2017 in which 4 U.S. Army soldiers from the 3rd Special Forces Group, 4 Niger Armed Forces troops and 1 interpreter were killed.

It happened in an operational environment where the U.S. Africa Command thought  things  were manageable.

It brings questions: what were U.S. troops doing there? After the ambush, some decision makers and policy people in D.C. were unaware of the activity. Either through lack of listening to briefs or other forms of ignorance.

The troops were there in a training and advisory role. Green Berets have an extensive amount of experience in counter insurgency work and training local troops to put up the effort. This level of skill can't be over-stated. (YouTube video, 2 hours 32 minutes, worth watching. It gives a good scope on Green Beret skill-sets.)

How do the Green Berets train foreign troops? Many times the home troop has low skill and or intelligence. It is done by recruiting and vetting locals, getting a baseline of soldering skills into the trainees. Culling those who can't hack it. Then taking the remainder and teaching them basic combat tactics and leadership. Culling more as needed, then the last part, which is more risk to the Green Berets, taking them out on real ops. Baby-steps first, then hopefully getting the home troops up to speed to where they can operate with minimal Green Beret supervision.

In the case of the Tongo Tongo Ambush, 35 Niger troops, 10 U.S. soldiers and 1 intel contractor which made up a patrol of 8 vehicles were operating very near the  Mali border. The threat were up to 100 fighters that used the Tongo Tongo area as a base to support insurgent operations in Mali.

Stories of the event are different depending on the source.

-U.S. and Nigerien sources differ on the nature of the fatal mission of Oct 4. Nigeriens say it was to go after Chefou; U.S. officials say it was reconnaissance mission.-

and...

-"The mission was conducted where we thought contact [with enemy] was unlikely," McKenzie said, adding, "I don't want to paint it as friendly territory."-

and...

-"A group of 12 members of a U.S. Special Operations Task Force accompanied 30 Nigerien forces on a reconnaissance mission from the capital, Niamey, to an area near the village of Tongo Tongo. 

Members of the team had just completed a meeting with local leaders and were walking back to their vehicles when they were attacked, U.S. officials told VOA. 

The soldiers said the meeting ran late, and some suspected the villagers were intentionally delaying their departure, one of the officials said."-

and...or...

-"Mountari said the team of 12 U.S. Special Forces soldiers and 30 Nigerien troops had been "right up to the Mali border and had neutralized some bandits" just before the ambush took place."-

And this is how Niger saw the U.S. relationship.

-"However, Mountari was clear he saw them as close partners.
"The Americans are not just exchanging information with us. They are waging war when necessary," he said.
"We are working hand in hand. The clear proof is that the Americans and Nigeriens fell on the battlefield for the peace and security of our country."-

This will go down in history as another special forces lesson.

Monday morning quarterbacking. The ambush was a complete surprise. The team did not have awareness of their surroundings. Things happened quickly and the team fell apart under overwhelming firepower. Insurgents used effective volume of fire and fire and movement.

There were no armed UAVs overhead.

Things happened so quickly that, even without the communications problems, emergency response fixed  wing air from the south would not get there in time even if they got the call. Later when French fighter aircraft arrived overhead to support  the recovery effort, they were unable to identify friend from foe.

French air  assets  to the south in Niamey.

US unarmed UAV assets way off  to the east in Agadez. 

Various people in the chain of command were punished. Some say there wasn't enough punishment to go around. The common thread was lack of  training to the threat. You be the judge.

It may also be another lesson in the kind of vehicles used for this type of operation. The U.S. has been near AK, PKM, heavy machine-gun and RPG threats for 60 years.

No place for soft vehicles. Even the lackluster Stryker can get in a bad way if the dirt insurgent has armor-piercing ammo for their PKM.

Some kind of light tank may help? 

I don't see these kind of operations stopping. No matter what leadership is in D.C.

This is a YouTube summary of the ambush. Warning: it is hard to watch.